HOW MUCH MORE HOGWASH CAN YOU GET?

May 27, 2008

CHAPTER 4

 DELIBERATE MISCUES

        113At the outset, (mentioned in the extended prologue,  but not yet posted), I have pointed out that the Court would pick out the weakest argument of party and demolish this argument in a long and winded-rhetoric but it would not dare discuss a very relevant and material issue of the case if it has already made its mind on how to dispose of it.

        Observe how the Court had demolished the contention of Atty. Inocentes that as a Senior Partner, he should not be held responsible for the  “fiasco” of the attorneys’ in his employ. The Court’s discussion of this issue was kilometric and complete with 2 page-full footnotes and citations of authorities. 

     But in the case of a lawyer who was implementing a lawful writ of execution and had received partial payment for the debts from someone who offered to pay the debts mentioned in the court decision, the SC did not cite any single authority except to say that the lawyer is liable for “technical extortion”.  But why so?  

         The court was mute.

         Not a single case was cited to support the position that a lawyer implementing a lawful writ can be subjected to technical extortion from losing litigants. And if my case is the first case, the Supreme Court would normally introduce the concept as being novel and first of its kind. But in the case of a senior partner who did not supervise his associate, the Court citations of authorities were kilometric. Atty. Inocentes di d not deserve to be admonished not because he was not part of this fiasco but because there was no fiasco. 

          The Court remains mute in the face of the challenge made by the author that it defines the term “extortion or technical extortion” and to find out if those crimes, (if there is such a crime of technical extortion) applies to a situation of lawyer who was implementing a court order to evict the defendant, Gliceria and any other persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises in question for unpaid rents and to collect the unpaid rents there from, did so pursuant to such court order.

        Readers should take note too that Atty. Camano did not go to George or Elvira to collect the unpaid rents. The mother-son tandem had approached Atty. Camano after they were refused audience by Atty. Inocentes and offered to liquidate the unpaid rents of the apartment long vacated by Gliceria and subsequently occupied by George and Elvira after the deputy sheriff had served on them the notice to vacate the apartment. 

           In any adversarial legal contest, you do not surrender any of your legal position to the opponent without a fight. Atty. Inocentes, in the light of erroneous finding of the IBP that there was a “technical extortion” committed by one of his associates, could have argued first that there was none by adopting the very reasons Atty. Camano had advanced early in the stage of the proceedings before the IBP. Then he could have embellished his argument with the usual legal refrain: “assuming for the sake of argument that one of his associates has committed the heinous act of technical extortion”,  he should not be faulted for this “fiasco”. 

        The author finds it astonishing as well as perplexing that a lawyer seemed so pleased and overjoyed for being admonished by the Court for a “fiasco” that he has nothing to do about.

      There was some slant too in the way the IBP or the Supreme Court has alluded to the fact that the apartment complex in question were sequestered because they were owned by Mr. Marcos’ cronies and thus created already a bias that the lawyers were Marcos loyalists. The law office of Atty. Inocentes was not entirely the lawyer of the spouses as the law firm was virtually forced on the spouses by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) because the one hundred or so tenants of the complex had taken advantage of the sequestration as an excuse not to pay the rentals. The PCCG had issued a memorandum to all the tenants in 1986 to remit their rentals to the PCGG but no one has complied with the memorandum.

            Paralyzed by the legal impasse, the PCGG has authorized the law firm of Atty. Inocentes allegedly as the lawyer of the spouses to eject the non-paying tenants and among those sued the following year after the sequestration was Gliceria Solatan, sister of complainant in the administrative case, George.

       Take note also that neither the IBP nor the Court has defined the meaning of extortion or the term  “technical extortion”. The IBP made a conclusion unsupported by the facts and the Supreme Court gobbled it up hook-line and sinker. 

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ARTIST LAYOUT

May 26, 2008

   113 

            “When the printing press had received Tony’s cover design for the book, people in the layout department were disconcerted to find what they thought was a blurry and fuzzy image of a building in between the titles and my name. They had lost no time in asking me to contact Tony  and ask him to send a clearer copy of the design.  I e-mailed Ms.  Weng, the go-between the press and me  and told her that the blurred image is the artist’s figurative rendition of the termite-ridden building of the Supreme Court. I could have requested for a clearer picture or a newly-spruced up building to replace the image because the “Termites are Within” the building and not outside it, but I think the termites will soon be outside the building nibbling away every palisade that supports it”.

      “One can see how people could be limited but honest in their own perception and perspective.  The layout people in the printing press could have thought that that a more picturesque building professionally laid out on a paperbound will reflect the printing press’s state of the art printing technology, which by itself can spur curiosity from bookworms to thumb through the pages of the book, but the artist who designed the cover had laid out the entire theme of the book in few blurred yet bold strokes even mindful that an art, like an encrypted message makes sense only if you can decode it”.

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PROLOGUE, Chapter 1

May 26, 2008

      113  Inasmuch as this is my first attempt at book writing, the pressure to come up with something that will stand the test of the times was tremendously smothering; difficult as writer Clarence Day’s standard that good books outlast the monuments and civilizations built by men:  “still young, still as fresh as the day they were written, still telling men’s hearts as the hearts of men centuries dead.” This is a very difficult task indeed, but I take comfort in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s counsel that the dullest author can write an interesting book by relating the events of his own life with honesty and not disguising the feelings that accompanied them.  To write about my life’s experience and be truthful about it, is a task I can do and that is not as formidable as I thought it was, but nonetheless, I forewarned the readers not to raise their expectation because this book is written bereft of any literary qualities of Shakespearean ostentation, this is rather a creation of a neophyte author who tried to be honest and fair.

 TITLE FOR THIS BOOK

          In choosing the appropriate title for this book, I twiddled between two choices:  “Censuring Back The Supreme Court”  and  “Termites from Within”  I cannot prefer one over the other, so I used one for a title and the other as a subtitle.

         Censuring Back the Supreme Court is appropriate for two reasons: Firstly, the Court has been noted for its institutional arrogance and peremptory censures of judges, lawyers and court employees based on the complaints of some well-meaning as well as not too-well-meaning complainants. I thought it is time now that the Supreme Court should receive the dose of its own medicine which for decades it has prudently or imprudently prescribed to all the people it may have considered its docile subjects and trivial chattels.  Secondly, it is time now to pierce the myth of the Supreme Court’s claim to monopoly of legal wisdom, prudence and moral superiority and the myth of it being untouchable and infallible. It is time now to censure the Supreme Court back which like the other two branches of the government had been contemptuous of the concepts of liberty and freedom and the principle of public accountability.

      “Termites from Within”   is also appropriate because our leaders behave like species of social insects that gnaw the very foundation of our democratic institutions; nibble our moral fiber and desecrate our freedom which our patriotic forefathers had sanctified with their blood. Centuries after we have gained our freedom from the Spaniards and decades after we have secured it from the Americans and the Japanese, our country remains poor, our economy in shambles, and our moral values shattered. President Manuel L. Quezon was prophetic enough when he said that he would rather see a nation run like hell by Filipinos than like heaven by the Americans. 

      The country is now run like hell by Filipinos. Should we rejoice about it now?

CHAPTER 1

                                 MY PRIVATE THOUGHTS

        In the Philippines, lawyers are being looked upon for some answer in the enigma and the idiosyncrasies of the political and economic life of the nation, and therefore, they become highly opinionated. I have my opinion of the state of the nation and our leaders but I considered it one of my private thoughts. I was not about to broadcast my private thoughts because I see no reason for a public discourse of my perception of what ails the country and curse the darkness where I could have lighted a candle. But that position has changed. Cursing the darkness so the people who hold the candle and the matchstick to light it, are actually prodded upon to light it could be as patriotic act as lighting a candle itself; and viewed from another perspective, this book could serve as my own lighted candle, and hope that it brings some light in the faded vision of our leaders and light their path in the arduous travel to seek prosperity for our nation and goodwill of all others. The corruption in the Supreme Court though, was foremost of all my private thoughts. 

RADIO INTERVIEW OF JUSTICE PADILLA

       In 1997, I was driving home after court trial one morning when I heard Ms. Korina Sanchez and then retiring Supreme Court Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla over ABS-CBN radio program. Asked about the index of corruption in the judiciary from level 1 to 10, Justice Padilla said level  7.

      Tumultuous uproar was heard from the judiciary after that interview and Justice Padilla had tried to back track from his assessment of the corruption in the judiciary.

        At another time, I heard Ms. Sanchez again with the good Justice and this time he said that when he had given the level of corruption in the judiciary, he was referring to the lower courts only. I told myself, he was right because the corruption in the Supreme Court was at level 10 already!   

           This was my private thought then and I wish I could make this private up to my grave. There is some hyperbolic nuance in this claim because only the laws of science and physics can make an attribute of absolute  quantification, but in an institution like the Supreme Court, there could be one or two magistrates who remain, despite the decay in our moral values, honorable and distinguished. The claim then that the SC is 100 per cent corrupt is only to emphasize the point that it is more corrupt than the lower courts and not the other way around, and therefore, it has lost its moral authority to censure or rebuke lower court judges, and I should add, the moral authority to censure most trial lawyers.

          “I have said in my motion for reconsideration that I have high respect of the Supreme Court, but somehow its four members were able to read through my pleadings that I have only contempt of its four members when I said that I was willing to be weighed in a moral scale with any one of them. I am not afraid to trade barbs with the Court if honor is the name of the game, for after all I have not held any position of power and therefore I am clean from the filth and slime of the back-door quid pro quo transactions of those who wield power.”  (p. 10).

Chapter Two
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PURSUIT OF INNER PEACE

May 26, 2008

         113Court trial in Metro Manila is a time consuming endeavor. One would get up early in the morning to go to his court assignment and reach the court after one or three hours travel because of the traffic jam in the streets of Metro Manila. Though you wake up at five in the morning and be done with your morning ritual and breakfast at seven, your two hours or so travel barely makes you to the court which normally bangs its gavel at nine and closes the session hall at past twelve noon. Some predictable traffic snarl in most streets of Manila can lengthen your travel woes and either you were late or the judge was. You arrived panting and wheezing and the first thing you do was to look at a three-page calendar of cases for the day and find out that you were on the third page of the calendar. It takes about one and a half hours to call the cases in open court to find out which of those in the list were to proceed to trial. Most of the time, pyrotechnics erupt on preliminary issues between two lawyers, thus your waiting time could stretch to another hour. At 12:00 noon or at one o’clock in the afternoon either you were hungry or the judge was, and the court would adjourn. Most cases are re-scheduled for a couple of months or even three months. Courts in the Philippines do not hold afternoon session except for certain courts whose judges were too earnest to dispose of the backlogs in their courts. Afternoon is normally devoted to writing orders and decisions. A trial lawyer in the big cities like Metro Manila wasted most of his time commuting to the court then waiting for the clerk of court to wrap up the roll-call of his calendar. Of the three dozen of cases scheduled for the day, only about three cases would go to trial. You were extremely lucky if your case went to trial and saw some glimmer of a head start of a case that had been with the court for almost eternity; otherwise you would go back to your office ahead of other lawyers who felt more honorable because the day’s fee paid by the client is not lost as he has to slug it out in court with his equally gallant opponent lawyer. But if you were a very enterprising lawyer and had already predicted that there was a ninety per cent chance that your case would be rescheduled for another date, you can accept another assignment on the same date and time in a next door judge then shuffle yourself from one court room to another and be paid on both cases. But more often, a trial lawyer despite his seal to attend to a client’s case had to agree on postponement either suggested by the court or the adverse counsel for “lack of material time”. Thus in most occasions, you have to go back to your office feeling nauseated because you earned your day’s keep by postponing your case and while on your way back to your office you feel even more nauseated by the black smoke and carbon monoxide bellowing from raggedy and rickety buses, trucks and jeepneys that ply the streets of Metro Manila. You find sediment of this pollution even in the exhaust of your private air-conditioned car and you can only empathized with the plight of the people who ride those buses and the pedestrians on the streets that are assaulted daily by this black soot and poisonous gas because for long you have been one of them until you were able to afford your own private car, which oddly enough would not even protect you from this pollution.

 

      A Filipino trial lawyer would not have much time for reflection and to seek for inner meaning and peace. Most of his weekdays proved to be unproductive. At times that his cases were finally over and won them after long years of deep slumber in the courts, his gains were purely symbolic and pyrrhic.

 

 

     The problems in the streets of Metro Manila are duplicated in the court room where the lawyer used to argue his case. Traffic moves at a snail pace, and so is justice; streets are polluted, and so are some of court decisions.  In April 2000, I have migrated to the US and left my solo and comfortable law practice. I have simple needs and simple taste; no fancy cars, jewelries, and mansions, thus a dozen or so clients support my expenses and my wife worked as a nurse in the US even before the children and I have relocated to America. I have my private thought about leaving my law practice because I love the law and dread leaving it. I have wished that my private thought about my leaving the country to seek for some greener pasture and peace should remain private up to my grave until the Supreme Court censured me for allegedly “extorting”  an individual who failed to pay his apartment rentals, then I thought that this private thought should be made public too.  In my argument with the Supreme Court explaining that I was not guilty of  “technical extortion” I have added a footnote:

 

            I have mixed feelings when in year 2000 I have decided to migrate to the US to face an uncertain future. I love my profession and I love the law. I graduated from University of the Philippines, (UP) in 1978 and I believe I learned the law well and had made use of it honorably and decently. I learned it through hard work and countless hours of reading books from the UP Library at UP Law Center and from professors who have remained steadfast to the core values of honor, integrity and valor. I consider the law profession noble and I consider it as a battlefield; a ferocious, vicious and violent one, and I consider myself as a soldier. This battlefield is littered with lawyers, charlatans and scoundrels alike who wanted to get at each other’s throat everyday in the courtroom as well as in the corporate boardrooms. After 19 years of   “soldiering”, I thought it was time to quit the battlefield and seek for inner meaning and peace. But giving this battlefield up was not an easy task. I thought I can get away from this field so easily but I was wrong. The thought that if I were to leave I would have surrendered the battlefield to card-bearing scoundrels, distresses me no end. But nonetheless I left the Philippines. I quit the battlefield and I wept. Now I weep even more to know that even the once prestigious IBP has been invaded by scoundrels, scumbags and all. I have brought this agony and anguish upon myself to bear and blame no one else, for despite the grand claim of having known it all, I have miserably failed in learning one enduring core value: VALOR. Like a true soldier I should have not quit the battlefield. I should have died fighting.

 

September 12, 2005, Dearborn, MI. USA.

 

            In America, I was blessed with time to reflect. I have time to watch television documentaries and political and economic analysis of television hosts and their guest of experts. But like the television talk shows in the Philippines, the US television has it own share of garbage polluting the airwaves. I am not about to discuss this pollution. I have selectively chosen TV programs which were very enriching and informative. I have watched President Richard Nixon’s documentary and had sympathized with the man of enduring courage and wisdom. With all his fault and shortcomings, he had the wisdom and the courage to take the fall and sacrificed everything in the interest of the greater good, that of the Nation and the people by resigning the Presidency. Courage that we did not see from Mr. Marcos until the nation moved in on him in the streets of Mendiola and EDSA and courage we did not see from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court when his integrity was placed in serious doubt so the Supreme Court can recover from whatever integrity left with it after cavorting with Mr. Marcos during those long martial law years. Courage we did not see from Mr. Estrada until few deaths littered the streets of Metro Manila and his cabinet secretaries had abandoned him solitarily in Malacanang Palace in 2001.

 

      I was amazed with Nixon’s fortitude to seek the  “peace at the center” and not to hate the people who have hated him. His philosophy could have been influenced by someone who walked this earth more than 2,000 years ago and who gave us the first enduring philosophy that we should turn our left cheek when our enemy hit us on the right cheek. The same enduring virtue Gandhi used in subduing the proud and almost invincible British Empire. It was the same philosophy that Senator Benigno      Aquino had tried to emulate before he was murdered in 1983 in an international airport in Manila, now named to honor him.

 

        Gandhi was willing to be bruised by the British soldiers without let up and without putting up a fight until the soldiers would lose their appetite to beat him up.    

         Senator Aquino was imprisoned by Mr. Marcos for 7 years and was sentenced to die by Mr. Marcos’  military tribunal but when he got the news that Mr. Marcos was ill, he hurried back home to talk some sense to the President to call for an election and transfer power to the civilian government instead of allowing a military junta to rule the country.

 

         In the Philippines I have no time to reflect. I was too busy trying to earn a living and reflection was a commodity I could not afford. When in court, most people you have met were very uninteresting people, who just like you, were simply trying to earn a livelihood and have no time for intellectual and philosophical discourse.          

             

         In separate occasions I have witnessed two lawyers while in Court suffered heart attack. One died in the courtroom and the other was partially paralyzed. The one who died was a total stranger to me and the one who was paralyzed was a lawyer of the Philippine National Railways whom I have met as an opposing counsel in a case. We ended up good friends after the case was terminated. The one who died was not fortunate enough to write about his trial experience in court, while my friend may not be  able to write as good as when he was healthy. I am more fortunate because God has given me time to reflect and to write.

              I am writing my reflections now though I have yet to attain my inner peace.     If I had my peace, I would have been tolerant of the foibles of the Supreme Court and the corruption of our government officials, but then I would have reneged from my civic duty to call the attention of the mighty that the nation suffers because of its misdeed.  A civic duty I have almost abdicated had not the Supreme Court and the IBP called me a despicable extortionist.

           It was farthest from my mind to indict the entire judicial system of which on few occasions has provided me with the opportunity to meet decent practitioners, judges and prosecutors.  The Supreme Court had virtually motivated me to exercise this civic duty and make this narrative possible.

              

          For almost 19 years as a trial attorney, and about three years as a corporate lawyer of a government-owned and controlled corporation, I have met honorable people who took pride in the ideals that they had been parts of a complex that dispenses justice to everyone.   I had agonized over the thought that my contrary perception about this complex could hurt these few good and upright people.

 

         I used to believe that whatever is the sad condition of the judiciary, there is always a silver lining in the horizon for its redemption. I used to tell my classmates who became judges later that I always see deliverance of the judiciary whenever I see my classmates in the bench. But this too was said in private occasions and gatherings among classmates. There were good judges and lawyers who did not graduate from UP and there were bad lawyers and judges who graduated from UP.

 

       Some of those who would agree with me would be quick to point out that I am one of these bad UP graduates. Atty. Vic Hipe would call this a  “factory-defect”, a description I could accept with a grain of salt even in the light of the record of the Supreme Court that I have been suspended from the practice of law for one year for  “technical extortion”.  I always maintained that I am not guilty of this misconduct and those who know how to read the records and evaluate the evidence can attest to this fact.

         I must be prepared too for the brickbats thrown on my way genially for after all this is a free country (or is it?) and everyone is entitled to voice out his opinion on the issue.

 

          But I did not draw the first blood.

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THE SINS OF THE SUPREME COURT

May 26, 2008

 113                                                        Chapter  2  

 

  “There have been instances when the Supreme Court has legitimized official action offensive to human rights and disruptive of Constitutionalism. Hence, as we await the  decision of the current Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the gag rule in Executive Order 464, and of Proclamation 1017 and the various official actions it occasioned, as  well as the uses of BP 880, it might be salutary to review how our Supreme Court has sometimes,  to our national regret, played around with sacred constitutional principles”.  (Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.).  

      The sins of the Supreme Court are in the pages of its court register and the volumes of SCRA and run through the pages of Metro Manila newspapers and in the 2003 impeachment complaint  against the Chief Justice.   If one would think that not only once, but several times, the Supreme Court had been embroiled in scandals, then it must not be seen as a dispenser of censures but as a receiver; it must get the dosage of its own medicine and instead of dishing out censures and reprimands to lawyers, judges, sheriffs and judicial employees, it should be able to prescribe one for itself or the public must dish it out forthright to the court in return.   

      An accusation was made against the Supreme Court or its Chief Justice that it has illegally disbursed the Judicial Development Funds which was earmarked for the cost of living allowance of judicial employees. The accusation went on to say that judicial employees’ entitlement to P527 Million had not been paid. Funds for cost of living allowance were disbursed instead to renovate the Supreme Court Session Hall for P64 Million; Renovation of Baguio vacation houses for justices, their families and friends, P34 Million; construction of SC-CA Multipurpose Building, P100 Million; Acquisition of Luxury cars, P31 Million, and subsidy for the CA printing press, P5 Million. 

         The Supreme Court has a misplaced sense of values and priorities. Ordinary court employees who were reeling from the effect of the astronomical cost of living expenses throughout the country could hardly afford, let alone dream of a vacation, and yet the Court has spent, among others, the funds earmarked for them for the jurists’ luxury cars and vacation houses for their families and friends in Baguio City. 

        There was this not too recent bar scandal too where two associate justices got sacked because one had asked the other to work on the bar grader to adjust the grade of a candidate who happened to be the son of the other magistrate. 

       In another yet befuddling scandal, a jurist had conveniently retired from the Supreme Court to avoid further public scrutiny over a decision which was allegedly  “ghost-written” by the lawyer of a big telecommunication involved in the case before the court.

         But the most grievous sins of the Supreme Court were committed during the martial law years.  A chief justice ran errand for Imelda Marcos and held her umbrella so the First Lady would not be exposed to sunlight and ruin her flawless skin. 

        And on referendum cases, except for two of its members: Justices Claudio Tehankee and Calixto Zaldivar, most of its members considered the “Marcos constitution”  ratified by  “viva voce” in the barangay meetings held throughout the country in 1973.

           President Marcos was a brilliant and an astute politician. When he declared martial law on September 21, 1972, he immediately ordered the closure of Congress and the various mass media outlets and ordered the arrests of those whom he cannot control.  Mr. Marcos knew that he could not contain the irrepressible spirit of Senator Aquino, the oratories of Senators Tanada, Sumulong and Soc Rodrigo, and the depth and wit of Senators Jose W. Diokno, Jovito Salonga and Gerardo Roxas. 

           Mr. Marcos cannot use the carrots to silence Congress, thus, he used the stick and brute force to quell congress. The President cannot silence the press too with carrots so he used the stick instead. He ordered the closure of the Free Press Magazine by the Locsin’s and the Manila Times by the Roces family, Manila Chronicle by the Lopez’s as well as other media outlets. 

         Mr. Marcos did not touch the Supreme Court. He knew that these aging magistrates were pliant and malleable. He saw the Court as an effective ally who on subsequent years proved to be true as the Court had virtually pledged undying loyalty to the   President by ratifying his every act and giving him the authority to rule by Presidential Decrees when these decrees were challenged before the Court. Thus, it has clothed Mr. Marcos’ dictatorial regime with color of legitimacy and validity. Mr. Marcos must have used the carrots, or it was possible that the justices. intellectual predilections have perfectly dovetailed with Mr. Marcos’ agenda hence there was no need for the carrots.  But who knows?   As a newspaper columnist had aptly said during the bar re-grading scandal:  “If a member of the Court can do someone a favor for the sake of his own  “brethrens” in the bench, imagine what he can do for money?”

        During this re-grading bar scandal, a newspaper columnist wrote that of all the members of the Supreme Court, only one has the balls intact to speak about the truth and it was possessed uncharacteristically by a woman jurist. Obviously, he was referring to Justice Ameurfina Hererra who was instrumental in blowing off the lid wide open about the bar scandal.

      Justice Hererra must have been outraged by this dishonesty and she thought it unfair to her and others who have taken the bar exams without any illicit external aid from those who are supposed to fight against it. She was after the integrity of the process which her distinguished  “brethrens”  did not care so much about and they would wish to keep the scandal hidden from the public and sealed under the court’s well-manicured rugs.

             AQUINO V. ENRILE

                The discussion of the Supreme Court of the Aquino v. Enrile case went at length on the existence of the threat of subversion from both the Maoist New People’s Army and the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front from Mindanao, (MNLF). The threat from the NPA and the MNLF, however, can be  easily contained by the Army which remained loyal to the institution of the government. The deference the Court made to the President to declare martial law on account of his control of various agencies which monitored the activities of the  “enemies” of the state has blunted the Court’s right to inquire into whether such state of insurrection existed or not, and considered his determination of the state of emergency a political question therefore beyond the power of the court to inquire. Thus it has conveniently failed to inquire into the motives of the executive about those claims in the light of the fact that Mr. Marcos in 1973 can no longer run for President and even if he could, the faltering economy and the unpopularity of his government made the  “Boy Wonder” from Tarlac a shoo-in for the Presidency. Martial law was an excuse for perpetration to power and the Supreme Court was nothing more than a willing accomplice of the repression that follows. The Aquino case was a plethora of 448 pages of legal dissertations and historical events designed to distort the crucial period of our history itself. Those moments in our history where two political titans have tried to compete for one political firmament and one was about to outshine the other had not his opponent beckoned the institutions of power and used those institutions to outclass his competitor. But in the minds of the historians, and the generations to come who are willing to see through the fog of distortions made by the Court, Senator Aquino has outclassed his nemesis; he died a glorious death – his blood rekindles the Filipinos’ love for freedom, while his tormentor died a silent death, felled by sickness in a strange and far away soil. 

       Early in the game, the late Senator Jose W. Diokno, whose arrest was made on suspicion that he might join the  “rebellion”  had petitioned the Supreme Court for habeas corpus through his wife Carmen, but later he had withdrawn his petition and abandoned Senator Aquino, accused as a murderer and countless other prisoners who were considered participants in the rebellion because he had seen the Supreme Court neutered by Mr. Marcos’ power-grab and was rendered spineless by his shadows. He refused to join the masquerade firmed in his belief that the Supreme Court cannot perform its solemn duty to uphold the law and dispense justice for everyone.

         Incisively, Senator Diokno told the Court: “that the decision in this case by the Court, what ever it may be, will be cited in history books many, many years from now. And it will be quoted wherever lovers of freedom ask the question,  What did the Court do in that difficult hour?” 

            The nation knows the answer too well. Treason!

              “Thus the grievous treason and subversion committed against the motherland was perpetrated not by the murderous thugs and misguided elements of our society, but by the very people in the corridors of power, who paradoxically, were sworn to uphold the law and be the zealot guardians of its citadel”.  

        The termites of our society were having a field day.

                “The nation has not been forewarned of the Ides of March and even if she was, just like Julius Caesar, she too was helpless in the face of determined assassins’ intent to do her harm. So, in those dark years, she has not only been ravaged and plundered but her institutions had been defiled. The vicious dagger slid through her side and she was caught off-guard. The Brutus and the Cassius of our nation  were in place and hailed the tyranny in the name of liberty. The nation lay prostrate from economic  ruin but its linen soaked in blood of betrayal had overshadowed the  debauchery of its coffers, and as she  struggled to get up,  she caught a  glimmer  of an imposing structure lined with 12 people in fine judicial robes and in a faltering  voice she managed to whisper: Were you in it too?”

               We do not have the sage and the judicial temperament of US Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor who said: “A state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens.” 

        And as the magistrates retreat in their chambers and reflect on the fate of the nation or the plight of a convict facing the lethal injection, one could only wish that they suffer not from the maladies that seem to lurk and haunt every corner of the court’s expensively renovated halls.

Chapter Three

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PARALLEL IN OBSCENITIES

May 26, 2008

BOOK COVER

 

                 CHAPTER 5

                 PARALLELISM

       In 1969, my father, while working as a capataz was laid off from his job together with some 20 other  “plantilla”  employees when the new governor of the province of Camarines Sur took over.  For more than two years my father was out of job so we have to quit school. Atty. Vicente Bonot, ex-provincial board member took the cudgels for the employees and sued the provincial government and the governor and after more than 2 years of legal battle, the dismissed employees were ordered reinstated by then Court of First Instance Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento.  (Cledera vs. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 552).

 

       The employees were paid their back wages.

                                             

       After my father got his job back, one of my brothers had refused to go back to school. I did not hesitate to go back to school. I persevered and I thought that whatever setback I have had in life, God must have willed it that way.  Instead, my resolve to pursue education became more intense.

 

       As I looked back in hindsight I could not help but ask what if at the time of my suspension from the practice of law I was still in the Philippines and my family was totally dependent on me for support? What if I did not allow my wife to work abroad and keep her around the house to attend to her children? Would my youngest girl who was in second year high school at the time of my suspension have the same mind set as my brother who refused to return to school because his classmates were gone and he would be the biggest boy in the class? I viewed this possibility with endless trepidation and I could have felt endless bitterness to see my daughter out of school because I did not have the money to send her to school.  It must have been providential that we settled far and beyond the reach of the most vindictive IBP and the most corrupt Supreme Court that could financially hurt my family.  

 

         But such distance, alas, provides only veneer protection from the venomous pillory and scurrilous libel spewed by the most high and mighty on your good name. It is still embarrassing for someone to note that he was suspended from the practice of law for technical extortion. The balm of clear conscience is not soothing enough to calm you down. While we were not financially hurt by my suspension,  it has ruined my honor in the eyes of the public and I have to clear that cloud by writing this book though I do not have to write a book to claim my honor before God.

          

          Other lawyers, judges and court employees not situated as I was, may not be able to fight back the vitriolic venom spewed by the Supreme Court on their honor least they lost their pensions and retirement benefits they may have including their license to practice law.  May this book provide them some comfort and strengthen their belief that our Supreme Court could be that vicious and savage behind those immaculate judicial robes.

        

        When my father was removed from his job, I was saddened because my brothers, sisters and I have to quit school.  I did not feel any bitterness or pain. But as a teenager, I always inquire why some people have so much power that they can use to devastate others. I see no difference between the Supreme Court and the Governor of our province who dismissed my father and others from their employment in 1969. But the governor and the provincial board did not have the final say. They were censured by the trial court and ordered them to reinstate the laid off employees.

  

         Where does one go if the Supreme Court becomes unjust? Or where its claim to institutional infallibility and sole seat of legal wisdom becomes pure arrogance and hypocrisy?

  

           I have no answer. I have to write so I can reach the readers and tell them about the Court’s arrogance and insensitivity and corruption too. The readers are common people whose thinking is pure and unadulterated. They were not schooled in the art of  “compromise”, “double-dealing” and “double-talk”, the higher forms of twisted dialectics which seem to be the hallmarks of the Supreme Court and our government leaders.

  

         Of the three branches of government, it is the Supreme Court which is in a very enviable position of power. Unlike the President and the members of Congress who have to seek the mandate from the people every six years, four or three years, the members of the Supreme Court have a life tenure and they continue to serve as members of the Court throughout their fruitful as well as fruitless lives and even if they misbehaved while in office.  The only way the people can boot out a corrupt jurist in office is if he resigns or retire from office in a huff or in a hush, or under Mr. Marcos, “arm-twist” them to resign.    If you try to impeach a jurist of the Supreme Court, he would throw every bag of tricks on your way to protect his employment and sometimes he would invoke a constitutional technicality if convenient.

  

          And despite of what Mr. Marcos had done to the country during the darkest years of his misrule, some people could not help but feel nostalgic about the initial martial law years when he had purged the misfits in the Courts and had dismantled the private armies of the provincial warlords.

 

        I called the accusation of IBP for “technical extortion” moronic and its lawyers possessed with picayune talents and the officialdom of the IBP corrupt because I treasure my honor and consider it sacred and I do not want someone to play with it.   If someone is called an “extortionist” and it is not true, one would understand the language I used in fighting off this libel.  I was like a wounded dog placed at the corner and nowhere to go except to fight back and I did.

 

         I had asked the Court to rescue me from this baseless accusation. It was strange that the Supreme Court considered it of no moment to read the records of the case in order to repute my arguments and had simply denied my motion for reconsideration in one sweep minute resolution. Then another minute resolution had denied my second motion for reconsideration.

  

          Suddenly it dawned on me that during its  “fund anomaly crisis”  in 2003, which had been a subject of an impeachment proceeding in Congress against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., himself, the IBP was one of loyal adherents which embraced the Supreme Court and tried to shield it from attacks from some idealist members of Congress.

 

         The Court was comfortable in hiding behind the issue that  “no impeachment proceedings against a member of the judiciary can be filed twice in one year” instead of accepting the challenge made by its accusers and prove them wrong.  It was very ironic that inasmuch as you have already been previously questioned of wrongdoing, such would provide you immunity from being questioned for another wrongdoing. While I can understand this principle if it involves ordinary mortals who could be ruined by repetitive malicious prosecutions, the Supreme Court holds an awesome power not possessed by these mortals to have seen it fit to hide behind this doctrinal coattails.

  

        At the height of this “fund scandal”  I was in America. I was not one of the apologists of the Supreme Court like the IBP.  There was no rhyme or reason for the Supreme Court to rescue me and trash the IBP.

  

          Again, the Supreme Court was playing true to form: “returning someone a favor at the expense of the truth.”


MY SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW

May 26, 2008

                            CHAPTER 3

         My suspension from the practice of law for one year for technical extortion while I was already in America is detailed in the Supreme Court records and are  reproduced herein below. 

 

 

 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

MANILA

  SECOND DIVISION

 

 GEORGE C. SOLATAN, A.C. No. 6504

Complainant,

Present:

                                                                      PUNO, J.,

                                                                     Chairman,

- versus -                                                            AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 

                                      CALLEJO, SR.,

                                     TINGA, and  

                                                              CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

 

ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES Promulgated:

and JOSE C. CAMANO,

Respondents. August 9, 2005

x—————————————————————-x  

D E C I S I O N 

TINGA, J.:

 

        The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer client relationship the duty of loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as  “undivided”. This means that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or impairment from any conflicting interest.

 

        This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon City apartment belonging to the attorneys’ clients. On the basis of acts branded by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as  “bordering on technical extortion”, accepting funds and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the IBP resolved1 to recommend the suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1) year. It likewise recommended the reprimand of Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the principle of command responsibility. Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, as he questions the propriety of his being held administratively liable for acts done by Atty. Camano.2 However, the recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano shall also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.3 Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the firm name of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held office in his home located at No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City, while Atty. Camano was stationed at an .extension office. of the firm located in 3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon City.

 

 

        The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres and Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an apartment complex (the Genito  Apartments) located at 259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government PCGG) on 9 July 1986.4 The law office represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan, and subsequently, with authority from the PCGG.5 in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.6

 

 

          Complainant’s sister, Gliceria Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. It appears from the records that Gliceria Solatan left for the United States in 1986, and since then, the apartment was either intermittently used by members of her family or placed under the charge of caretakers.7

 

            In August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against Gliceria Solatan.8 On 3 March 1988, in a judgment by default, a Decision9 was rendered ordering Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the apartment, pay the spouses Genito the amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P30,600.00) as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with interest at 24% per annum from 20 August 1987 until the premises are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.10

 

         Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the judgment rendered against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, complainant and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home office.     

 

        Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease contract by virtue of which complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and thus make possible his continued stay therein. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments.

 

        After the exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the satellite office of Atty. Inocentes’s firm. From here on out, events quickly turned sour.  Different versions of subsequent events were presented. The facts reproduced hereunder are by and large culled from the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.

 

         During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant and his mother agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of the awarded attorney’s fees and One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of suit provided that Atty. Camano would allow complainant’s continued stay at Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing half of the P10,000.00 attorney’s fees adjudged against complainant’s sister.

 

         Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment.  Thus, the sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano and some policemen, enforced the writ of execution on 22 June 1988 and levied the properties found in the subject apartment.

 

 

          An attempt at renegotiation took place at the insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camano’s acquiescence to release the levied properties and allowing complainant to remain at the  apartment, subject to the latter’s payment of costs incurred in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks representing installment rental payments. Complainant, thus, issued four (4) checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company dated the fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September, and October 1988 each in the amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00).11 Half of the amount represented

Complainant’s monthly rental, while the other half, a monthly installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatan’s judgment debt.

 

 

          On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of Atty. Camano, complainant presented an Affidavit of Ownership to the sheriff who then released the levied items to complainant. However, a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was not retuned to complainant. The stove was in fact kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments wherein he temporarily stayed12 and, thereafter, turned over the same to a certain Recto Esberto, (note that IBP has erroneously interchanged the last of name of Mr.  Recto with his first name, underscoring by the author) caretaker of the Genito Apartments.13 On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Inocentes and  Atty. Camano.14 After formal investigation, and despite conflicting testimonies on the tenor and content of agreements and conversations, several disturbing facts were revealed to have been uncontroverted.   Atty. Camano’s acceptance from complainant of attorney’s fees and the costs of implementing the writ of execution, possession of complainant’s levied Northern Hill  oven, and advice to complainant on how to recover the latter’s levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating Commissioner Siegfred B. Mison, made the following recommendations, viz:

      

 

         Based on the facts revealed in their respective Memoranda, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent Camano for committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) on his moral fitness to continue to practice law[:]

  

1. He received money (P5,000 then P1,000) from the adverse party purportedly for attorneys fees and for reimbursement of sheriff’s expenses. Such act of accepting funds from the adverse party in the process of implementing a writ, borders on technical extortion particularly in light of the factual circumstances as discussed.

 

 2. He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting the filing of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied properties, a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client, supposedly, the

Genitos.

 

 

3. He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby casting doubt as to the procedure of the levy.

 

           Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of Reprimand is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent Inocentes for committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) in his fitness to continue to practice law[:]

 

1. He allowed Camano to perform all the aforementioned acts, either by negligence or inadvertence which are inimical to the legal profession. He cannot claim ignorance or feign innocence in this particular transaction considering that the Complainants themselves went to his office on different occasions regarding this transaction. Ultimately, he exercised command responsibility over the case and had supervisory control over Respondent Camano inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person from the latter.

 

 

2.    The letter disclaimer executed by Mr. Genito filed by Respondent Inocentes does not mitigate any liability whatsoever since the wrongdoing done against the profession cannot be undone by a mere letter from a third party.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

  

      The IBP Board of Governors approved the aforequoted recommendation, with the modification of an increase in Atty. Camano’s period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year, in a resolution stating, viz: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the of the Investigating Commissioner’ finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and for accepting funds from adverse party in the process of implementing a writ borders on technical extortion, for giving unsolicited advice to the adverse party a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the levy, Atty. Jose C. Camano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby REPRIMANDED for he exercised command responsibility over the case inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person.16 The IBP held that Atty. Camano’s act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable act because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the interests of an attorney’s actual clients among themselves, of existing and prospective clients, and of the attorney and his clients. It states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.17 An attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being retained.18] To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession.19 At the time the questioned statement was made, Atty. Camano had called the police to restrain complainant from surreptitiously pulling out the levied properties from the apartment complex by virtue of which the latter was brought to the police station for questioning. The statement was made in response to complainant’s insistence at the police station that the levied properties were owned by him and not by the judgment debtor.20      No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case. More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the same Code which encompasses the aforementioned rule. In general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all of dealings and transactions with their clients dealings and transactions with their clients.21 Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some relief adverse to the former’s client may be labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case, the acts alleged to be culpable must be assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances.

 

        While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the properties.  

 

 

        Consequently, the latter had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances, the questioned statement is in consonance with complainant’s foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. Camano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties. We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the latter’s confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients. cause.  Nonetheless, after having noted the foregoing, we remain convinced with the propriety of meting the one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on Atty. Camano, as recommended by the IBP, based on his other  culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of court processes.

  

       On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that transpired and the reprimand resulting therefrom by asserting that he was incorrectly punished for Atty. Camano’s acts when his mere participation in the fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother to Atty. Camano.

 

        However, it is precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of referring the complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes may be held administratively liable by virtue of his associate.s unethical acts. His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. The term  “command responsibility”,  as Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning within the circle of men in uniform in the military; however, the principle does not abide solely therein. It controls the very circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes found himself. We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and even entire client accounts to associates or other partners with limited supervision, if at all. This is especially true in the case of Attys. Inocentes and Camano who, from the records, both appear to be seasoned enough to be left alone in their work without requiring close supervision over each other’s conduct and work output. However, let it not be said that law firm practitioners are given a free hand to assign cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the profession, the integrity and advancement of which this Court must jealously protect.

 

      That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office does not automatically make Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary diligence to find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the active responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the levy of complainant’s properties, irrespective of whether the same were in fact events which could possibly lead to administrative liability. Moreover, as name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 It is not without reason or consequence that Atty. Inocentes’s name is that which was used as the official designation of their law office.

 

     With regard to the actual existence of Atty. Inocentes’s supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano.s activities, the IBP Investigating Commissioner based the same on his finding that Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s dealings with complainant. This finding is the linchpin of Atty. Inocentes’s supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof.

 

      Law practitioners are acutely aware of the responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners and supervisory lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office. We have held that lawyers are administratively liable for the conduct of their employees in failing to timely file pleadings.23 In Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al.,24 partners in a law office were admonished for the  contemptuous language in a pleading submitted to court despite, and even due to, the fact that the pleading was not passed upon by any of the partners of the office. We held therein that partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of the law firm.25 We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by the persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the supervising lawyer in this regard is by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of control and supervision exercised by said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according to office practice, or the length of experience and competence of the lawyer supervised. Such factors can be taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged with the supervision of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should bear greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied enough with the work and professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her own devises.

 

     While Atty. Camano.s irregular acts perhaps evince a need for greater supervision of his legal practice, there is no question that it has been Atty. Inocentes. practice to allow wide discretion for Atty. Camano to practice on his own. It does constitute indifference and neglect for Atty. Inocentes to fail to accord even a token attention to Atty. Camano.s conduct which could have brought the then impending problem to light. But such is not equivalent to the proximate responsibility for Atty. Camano’s  acts. Moreover, it appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes is a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in good standing and it is the first time in which Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer vicariously for the misconduct of a person under his charge. An admonition is appropriate under the circumstances.

 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16 April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the activities of his associates to make sure that the same are in consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the WARNING that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.

 

No pronouncement as to costs.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

 

 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

 Associate Justice

 

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

 

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

 

[1]In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-231 dated 16 April 2004 for CBD Case No. 019 entitled George C. Solatan v. Atty. Oscar A. Inocentes and Atty. Jose C. Camano, Rollo, pp. 703-704. [2]Petition dated 28 July 2004, Rollo, p. 712-724.

 

[3]Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.  . (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,  together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. [4]Rollo, p. 6. See also p. 25. [5]Id. at 79. [6]Id. at 25, 70, and 78. See also p. 78.

 

[7]Id. at 409-414.

 

[8]Entitled .Sps. Andres V. Genito & Ludivina L. Genito v.

Gliceria Solatan,. docketed as Civil Case No. 51745.

 

[9]Dated 3 March 1988 rendered by Judge Ricardo A.

Buenviaje of MTC Quezon City, Branch 38.

 

[10]Rollo, pp. 77-78.

[11]See Rollo, p. 58.

[12]Id. at 581 and 624.

[13]Id. at 581 and 624.

[14]Id. at 136-150.

[15]Id. at 708-709.

[16]Supra note 1 at 703.

[17]RUBEN E. AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

2001 Ed., p. 138, citing Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 174 U.S. 412

(1899).

[18]Id. at 138-39.

[19]Id. at 139.

[20]Rollo, p. 578.

[21]Canon 15 . A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

 

[22]Many jurisdictions in the United States have adopted Section 5.1 of the American Bar Association.s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which relevantly requires, first, that partners make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has measures in effect to assure that all lawyers in the form conform to the rules of professional conduct, and second, that a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to these rules. This explicit responsibility was incorporated by some states in the late 1990.s but was in theory already being applied by several jurisdictions. See ZITRIN, RICHARD A., and LANGFORD,

CAROL M., LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 2ND Ed., p. 658; see also http:www.mass.gov/obcbbo/supervise.htm.

 

[23]Adaza v. Barinaga, 192 Phil. 198 (1981).

[24]G.R. No. L-22979, 26 June 1967, 20 SCRA 441.

[25]Id. at 446.

 

 

      The author has filed a motion for reconsideration  over the ruling of the Supreme Court.

 Chapter Four

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First Motion for Reconsideration

May 26, 2008

  113 (This motion has been excised of its privileged communication contents;  persons interested in the full-text of the document can read the original record from the Supreme Court).

             Respondent JOSE C. CAMANO, by himself most respectfully avers:

         1     That respondent Jose C. Camano and his family have migrated to the United States in April 2000 and since then he and his family have been living in the United States for long five years now;

        2.     That the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated on August 9, 2005, a Resolution suspending Atty. Camano from the practice of law for a period of one year;

        3.     That the said Resolution was received in respondent’s house at 19 Kalaw Ledesma Circle, Tierra Verde, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, Philippines on September 9, 2005 and forthwith, respondent’s son who happened to be on vacation for one month in the Philippines with his newly-wedded wife, phoned respondent who is residing at 6210 Kenilworth St., Dearborn, MI. 48126, USA about the Resolution;

       4.     That Atty. Camano took exception to the findings of the Honorable Supreme Court, on recommendation of the IBP, that he committed infractions of the code of professional ethics for  “Technical Extortion” and “Acts Tending to Degrade the Law Profession.”

 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

             Subsequent to the closure of the investigation conducted by the IBP, certain incidents transpired without the knowledge of Atty. Camano. First and foremost of which is the recommendation by the IBP that he be suspended for six months for alleged infractions of the professional code of conduct listed as follows: 

           1.       He received money (P5,000 then P1,000) from the adverse party purportedly for attorneys fees and for reimbursement of sheriff’s expenses. Such act of accepting funds from the adverse party in the process of implementing a writ, borders on technical extortion particularly in light of the factual circumstances as discussed.

            2.     He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting the filing of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied properties, a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client, supposedly, the Genitos’s.  He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby casting doubt as to the procedure of the levy.

               Such recommendation was never furnished to the herein respondent. The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and made the suspension for one year instead of six months, reasoning inter alia:

        “x x the Investigating Commissioner’  finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and for accepting funds from adverse party in the process of implementing a writ borders on technical extortion, for giving unsolicited advice to the adverse party a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the levy, Atty. Jose C. Camano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby REPRIMANDED for he exercised command responsibility over the case inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person.

          Further the IBP said:  “That Atty. Camano’s act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable act because the advice conflicted with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting interests’ established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the interests of an attorney’s actual clients among themselves, of existing and prospective clients, and of the attorney and his clients. It states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.   

         Said recommendation modifying the suspension for six months to one year has never been furnished to Atty.  Camano.  

        Respondent Atty. Inocentes has filed a misleading pleading with this Court which in the language of the Court:

                 “On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that transpired and the reprimand resulting there from by asserting that he was incorrectly punished for Atty. Camano’s acts when his mere participation in the fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother to Atty. Camano.

        Respondent Atty. Inocentes did not furnish Atty. Camano of this pleading despite his knowledge that Atty. Camano has long ceased to be his associate, and whom he knew could be reached at his residence at Tierra Verde, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Only the Honorable Supreme Court had deemed it an essential requirement of due process to furnish the respondent herein with the copy of its Resolution dated August 9, 2005 at his residence and law office.

          With the foregoing background, Atty. Camano could hardly fault this Honorable Court in accepting the recommendation of the IBP for his suspension for one year. For in the mind of the Court, Atty. Camano who failed to respond to these subsequent incidents, pleadings and betrayal could only indicate an admission of guilt. Far from it though for if this Court would only reread the records, it could easily sift through the rubbles and see the incontrovertible proof that Atty. Camano has acted within the bounds of decency and the law.

         While the IBP has coined the term “technical extortion” it is not entirely inappropriate for respondent Camano to coin another term, “denial of extended due process of law for deliberate failure of the IBP and respondent Inocentes to furnish copies of self-serving claims imputing alleged unethical behavior by Atty. Camano.  That had he been seasonably informed of these incidents, Atty. Camano could have disputed those allegations and could have put everything in the right perspective.

       Atty. Camano has the highest regards for this Court and it was already appreciative of its effort to furnish him copy of the Resolution dated August 9, 2005 and of knocking off from the table one of the alleged ethical violations of the respondent; that of  “giving unsolicited advice to a party opponent resulting in a position that conflicted with the interest of the client”.   Atty. Camano wishes to add though that clients come and go but one institution remains immutable and that is the law. More than anything else, it is this institution which demands highest fealty and loyalty from every lawyer. It was under this ideal that Atty. Camano has given the distraught George to  “execute an affidavit and provide proof of his ownership of the chattels”  because George had invoked the law by claiming ownership of the chattels and Atty. Camano had simply provided him the structure on how he could give the law its life.

        Thus only the  “Technical Extortion”  and Acts  “Tending to Degrade The Law Profession” remain as the alleged “infractions” committed by Atty. Camano which merited his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

           These ISSUES will be addressed and disputed accordingly herein below. Atty. Camano and his family are now living in the United States and his suspension does not affect in any least his capacity to earn in the US. But respondent considers his good name his wealth and an heirloom worthy to bequeath to his children. If respondent’s name is tarnished, such blemish is worst than death itself. 

          That the moment respondent was informed of the Resolution of the Honorable Court suspending him from the practice of law for ethical violations, he was both embarrassed and depressed. Embarrassed because the Resolution was read by his daughter-in-law who could have drawn an impression that her in-law DAD is some kind of a crook and a despicable person. 

          Depressed because an institution as the IBP came up with the most ridiculous accusation and rapped one of its members for “Technical Extortion” and had invented a twisted concept of “conflict of interest” violation never known in the law and the canon of professional ethics books before.

              Respondent begs this Court to take a second pass of the records and the evidence and see through the monumental spin, the lies and distortion of the IBP that scurrilously malign the good name of the respondent and for this Honorable Court to find that Atty. Camano has acted appropriately and decently in dealings with the complainant and in the service of his clients, Sps. Andres and Ludivina Genito.

 DISCUSSSION OF ISSUES

         Losing litigants have always an ax to grind. Most would conveniently become knights in moral shining armors riding those mythical white and imposing horses armed with lances and swords to rid the legal profession of scumbags and scoundrels that degrade the law profession and erode the public faith in the law.

         Overnight, George, became one of such crusaders to camouflage his vengeful spirit and disturbed soul and would vanish from the practice of law, Attys. Camano and Inocentes who were chiefly responsible for his grief and misery. He considered them roaches that must be expurgated from the law profession. To his credit and his lawyer, they were able to convince the IBP to find Atty. Camano guilty of  unethical behavior.

       The Resolution of this Court was accessed by Atty. Camano from the internet which explains why he could argue the points raised thereat but he could not access his own records from his house in Quezon City without loss of time and expense of sending those records to the US. And this pleading had been sent as an email attachment and electronically signed by Atty. Camano to his nephew with instruction to print it and file it with this Honorable Court.

 THE FACTS AND INCIDENTS

         Gliceria Solatan was served with summons and copy of the complaint at the subject unit of the Genito Apartments. She was already abroad at the time of service but her mother, Elvira and brother George who one after the other had occupied the unit after Gliceria had left, never informed the court about this important and crucial detail. A default judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and at the time a notice to vacate and to pay the judgment debt was served on whoever occupied the premises, the unpaid rentals had already ballooned to P60,000 more or less.

       Elvira and George went to respondent Inocentes at 19 Marunong St., Diliman, Quezon City after the notice to vacate was served by the deputy sheriff. George, according to Atty. Inocentes was so arrogant that he refused to talk to him and his mother. They were referred to respondent Camano who was holding office at another location in Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.

          During the meeting with respondent Camano at the said office, Elvira never introduced herself as the mother of Gliceria. Atty. Camano assumed, although erroneously, that inasmuch as she came for the case of Gliceria and had introduced herself as Ms. Solatan, this visitor must be Gliceria and George the brother.  

         Both offered to liquidate the unpaid rentals provided they be allowed to stay in the apartment. Such offer firmed up the erroneous assumption of Atty. Camano that Elvira was Gliceria. For after all why offer to settle the arrears when she was not duty-bound to pay them? And even if she did introduce herself as Elvira, the mother and not Gliceria, the absconding lessee, such would not detract from the fact that they were there to offer to pay the judgment debt.

         Whereupon they were told that as long as they were willing to pay the judgment debt, they would remain in the premises. The terms of the proposed agreement were discussed and both agreed to abide by it. During this meeting, the issue of lease renewal to George and Elvira over the same unit never came about although during the IBP hearing, George and Elvira claimed that they had asked Atty. Camano for a new lease. That even if they did, Atty. Camano would not have consented to a new lease because of the enormity of the unpaid rents. Any lawyer worth his name would require a substantial payment of the arrears before any subsequent lease on the same unit could be agreed upon because a new lease would in effect render the judgment to vacate the unit ineffective.

           The claim therefore that a new lease was requested and Atty. Camano has agreed to it was not true. And even if he has agreed to it, he could renege on it because George did not honor the part of his own bargain to pay the arrears.

           To hold off the ejectment and levy, respondent Camano had asked George if he could pay the attorney”s fee and the cost of sheriff’s services. He offered to pay 50 per cent of the adjudged attorney’s fee and the cost of sheriff’s services. He dutifully paid the foregoing amount and he never was coerced nor extorted by Atty. Camano to come up with the payment. He also promised to pay the arrears. The amount of P1,000 was transmitted to the Deputy Sheriff to cover the cost of his services.

          The attorney’s fee paid by George was shared by respondent Camano with Atty. Inocentes as per agreement with Inocentes and his clients the spouses Ludivina and Andres Genito. Respondent Camano honestly believe that inasmuch as he has rendered professional hours in the preparation and filing of the case in court including the ex-parte trial, he is entitled to the share in the attorney’s fee adjudged by the trial court.

       George had reneged on his promise to pay the arrears. Respondent Camano had pursued the levy and execution which was temporarily postponed. After the deputy sheriff levied the properties and tried to evict George and his mother, George came begging respondent Camano to stay the levy and execution as he was then ready to pay the judgment debt according to what he had promised during the first meeting with Atty. Camano.   It was during this second encounter with George and Elvira that the latter finally admitted that Gliceria had long vacated the unit and that she and George now and in the past occupied the premises. But inasmuch as they were trying to come up with the payment, again respondent asked the deputy sheriff to postpone the execution. 

          So to effectuate his promise to pay the unpaid rents, George issued four postdated checks in the amount of P3,400.00 each check to cover the current rentals and the arrears. These checks were turned over to the accountant of the landlords. 

         Three of these checks bounced for reason of closed account. Finding George unreliable and infidel to his words, Atty. Camano decided to eject George and his mother. (The second check bounced for account closed, so the 3rd and 4th checks would bounce for similar reason).       

             It is worth emphasizing that the enforcement of the order to vacate the premises and to pay the debt was triggered by George’s “closed account” checks.

          The properties inside the unit which had already been previously levied were scheduled for auction by the deputy sheriff but before the auction date, George, using the darkness of the night as a cover, stashed away the levied chattels. The caretaker of the apartment, Mr. Esberto Recto called the police and George was brought to the precinct for questioning. He was distraught, he was angry, he was furious. Someone must pay for his embarrassment.

            Thus it was convenient for George to institute the instant complaint.

           The foregoing are the facts of the case and the narration of the Honorable Court of the facts as culled from the recommendation of the IBP, quoted herein below while it may have some semblance of truth, was not entirely truthful. It was so loaded to favor George.

           “Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the judgment rendered against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, complainant and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home office. Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease contract by virtue of which complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and thus make possible his continued stay therein. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments. After the exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the satellite office of Atty. Inocentes’ firm. From here on out, events quickly turned sour. Different versions of subsequent events were presented. The facts reproduced hereunder are by and large culled from the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.   “During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant and his mother agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of the awarded attorney’s fees and One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of suit provided that Atty. Camano would allow complainant’s continued stay at Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. As partial  compliance with the agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing half of the P10,000.00 attorney’s fees adjudged against complainant’s sister. Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano and some policemen, enforced the writ of execution on 22 June 1988 and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. An attempt at renegotiation took place at the insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camano.s acquiescence to release the levied properties and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment, subject to the latter’s payment of costs incurred in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks representing installment rental payments. Complainant, thus, issued four (4) checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company dated the fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September, and October 1988 each in the amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00). Half of the amount represented complainant’s monthly rental, while the other half, a monthly installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatan’s judgment debt.

         In an attempt to portray George in shining armor, the IBP did not mention the fact that the checks issued by George for the payment of the rentals both current and arrears, were dishonored for reason of  “closed account” except the first check which was honored and paid. It has conveniently omitted to mention too that the  “closed account” checks of George had triggered the enforcement of the writ to vacate. Because George who claimed to be an accountant could not justify his shining armor posture if the IBP would have mentioned the  “closed account” status of his checking account.

         George had agonized over the roaches in the legal profession but he was comfortable with misbehavior in the accountancy profession, for after all, the lawyers’ code of conduct must be above the standard set for accountants and Atty. Camano recognizes this fully well.  George admitted having occupied the unit with his mother and their efforts to settle the obligation was but a confirmation that they were the ones indebted to the Genito couple because they were the ones who lived thereat and derived benefit there from after Gliceria had left, otherwise they could have simply allowed the landlords to repossess the unit and have it leased to new tenants who are more than willing to pay the rents.

         After consulting with his own lawyer, Atty. Umali, George must have been advised that inasmuch as the judgment was against Gliceria, the judgment may not have legal effect on them and they can forget the fact that they were actually the ones residing in the unit and make use of the amenities thereat and for years provided roof over their heads. Thus George became combative in a wrong sense. It was strange that respondent was on the receiving end when the other lawyer should have been.

  THE IBP FOR ITS OWN REASON

COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE

MEANING OF CUSTODIA LEGIS

 The IBP made the following findings of fact:

          “An attempt at renegotiation took place at the insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camano’s acquiescence to release the levied properties and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment, subject to the latter’s payment of costs incurred in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks representing installment rental payments.”

          This is preposterous and erroneous because never at one time during the period aforementioned that Atty. Camano had authorized the release of the levied personal properties of George or Gliceria. What he did was to make representation with the deputy sheriff to postpone the writ of execution upon the representation of George and Elvira that they would pay the judgment debt. The properties were released only in favor of George after he had executed an affidavit with receipts and proof that these chattels were in his name and the release was made by the deputy sheriff and not by Atty. Camano and this came about much latter after George was arrested and questioned by the police about those chattels and that the verbal agreement to amortize the arrears on installment had been totally abrogated and abandoned by virtue of the foregoing circumstances.

          Atty. Camano was never in possession of the levied chattels; HENCE, he could not authorize nor acquiesce in the release thereof. Only the sheriff can, and as in fact did release the chattels to George. This has been the consistent position of Atty. Camano during the IBP investigation, but for reason of its own, the IBP has chosen to ignore this incontrovertible legal truth.

 THERE WAS NO EXTORTION

       Atty. Camano was implementing the writ of execution through the court’s sheriff and the persons who were served with the Order offered to pay the judgment debt by installment which resulted to Atty. Camano’s receiving the sum of P5,000 as partial payment for the adjudged attorney’s fee of P10,000 and sheriff’s cost of P1,000. George and his mother, in order to avoid being thrown out of the premises voluntarily offered to be allowed to pay on installment which offer was accepted by the landlords through Atty. Camano. To claim that respondent Camano has to arm-twist George to cough up the partial payments and to justify the charge of  “technical extortion” was ridiculous. Or that he has committed  “technical extortion”  because as a result of implementing a lawful process, he received partial payments from the other party, was also preposterous.  George became a substitutable adverse party by admitting that he was actually using the apartment and would not want to be ejected there from by offering payments of the arrears. Lawyers representing a litigant may accept money from the adverse party as a settlement for the judgment and only when the lawyer has failed to turn over such money judgment to his clients that he becomes professionally liable thereto. George and IBP did not accuse Atty. Camano of pocketing the money of his clients. Neither Andres nor Ludivina Genito had put Atty. Camano to task for absconding with their money. Somebody else was, but not Atty. Camano. And on the contrary, the spouses have remained trustful of Atty. Camano as explained in the latter part of this pleading.

       The court’s order was sufficient for the sheriff to throw out George and his mother from the premises and auction off any chattels in the premises to answer for the debt. And on the  contrary, it was respondent Camano who saved George and Elvira from being thrown out of the apartment outright because he and his mother had promised that they would pay the judgment debt of Gliceria, and had shown an initial willingness to pay when George paid one half of the adjudged attorney’s fee, the cost of the sheriff’s fee and later had issued 4 postdated checks, though as earlier pointed out, three of these checks had bounced. To claim that respondent Camano “technically extorted” George because he had received partial amount of the judgment debt from George is to misapply the meaning of  “extortion”.    

        Extortion occurs when a person obtains money, behavior, or other goods and/or services from another by wrongfully threatening or inflicting harm to his person, reputation, or property. Atty. Camano was implementing a lawful eviction order and an order to collect the unpaid rent through the deputy sheriff. It was strange that the IBP has chosen to ignore the contradiction between a lawful process and unlawful act of extortion, technical or otherwise.

          Or it has seen the difference, which explains why it has tried in vain to embellish or convolute it with the adjective “technical” rather than simply calling it extortion.   But what is  “technical extortion”?   It is a high sounding term incongruous and incomprehensible. At least, a kindergarten student knows the basic that you cannot add apples and oranges. These IBP lawyers are confused and thought it cute to invent the term  “technical extortion”.

         Atty. Camano agrees with anyone who claims that the law profession is littered with charlatans, scoundrels and incompetents that deserve to be purged from the profession. It is time now that the IBP looks no further than the four corners of its walls in Ortigas Office Complex. Or it can start with the members of its Board of Governors.

          The IBP or its lawyers were incorrigibly slow and exceedingly picayune not to realize that if a chattel was levied upon, it has been brought under the jurisdiction of the court and it is known in law as in  “custodia legis”.   Atty.  Camano was never at one time or another in possession of the chattel in question but the sheriff or the court. George demanded the return of all the chattels from the sheriff and not from Atty. Camano after he had executed an affidavit of ownership with corresponding receipts. The deputy sheriff had examined the affidavit and the receipts accompanying thereof and did not find proof that the stove belonged to George.

         Thereupon, all the levied items were returned by the sheriff to George except the unserviceable gas range, which proof of ownership, George has failed to produce. In fact George had never bothered to present any proof of ownership over the stove because either it was no longer serviceable or that it could have really belonged to the absconding lessee, his sister, Gliceria.

           But in any event, respondent Camano was never in possession of the chattel in question, malicious insinuation on the contrary, notwithstanding. The claim of the IBP that respondent had kept it and refused to turn it over to either party for personal gain was contrary to the records that Mr. Esberto Recto, the apartment caretaker has it in his possession.

       x x x (privileged communication contents, excised).

               It is ironic though that the plea of the herein respondent for non-culpability would free Atty. Inocentes of any wrongdoing as a consequence. x x x.

          George, in tattered moral armor harbored ill-feelings toward respondent Atty. Camano because he was thrown out of the unit through the efforts of the respondent. He saw the alleged corrupt character of respondent Camano but he failed to see his own face on the mirror. For after seeking refuge, shelter and comfort from the apartment and enjoying the amenities there from for years, and recognizing that he had such an obligation to pay the arrears, he tried to run away from the obligation and attempted to vanish into the wilderness of the night with his chattels in tow. Virtues become a rarity nowadays. Though respondent does not claim to any single saintly virtue in his vein, he has tried at least to be true to himself and claim with certainty that he can look at George, Attys. Umali, Inocentes and Mison and the whole members of the Board of IBP Governors and the Justices of the Supreme Court right into their eyes without blinking and be willing to be weighed in the moral scales with anyone of them.

       In a biblical sense, respondent would wish to be stoned only by those without sins.

        WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Resolution of this Honorable on August 9, 2005 suspending Atty. Jose C. Camano for one year from the practice of law be reconsidered and set aside and a Resolution be issued by this Court absolving him from alleged act of  “technical extortion” and from acts tending to degrade the law profession.

         Dearborn, Michigan, USA, September 12, 2005

  Atty. Inocentes filed a Comment on the Motion  

COMMENT AND MANIFESTATION

               To the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated September 12, 2005 filed by ATTY. JOSE C. CAMANO (hereinafter referred to as ATTY. CAMANO for brevity) under the following declarations and asseverations, to wit:

        1. Last September 27, 2005, the undersigned counsel received a copy of the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION filed by ATTY. CAMANO regarding the judgment of this Honorable Court in the above-captioned case affirming the sanction meted out against ATTY. CAMANO;

         2. And that while the undersigned counsel no longer seeks to question the ruling of this Honorable Court insofar as admonishment made upon him by this Honorable Court, there are however certain allegations aired out by ATTY. CAMANO in his MOTION FOR RECONSIDRATION which the undersigned counsel feels merits an immediate comment if only to correct any inaccuracies in the narration of facts and also to prevent any wrongful impressions which this Honorable Court may have in resolving ATTY. CAMANO’s motion for reconsideration;

         3. In this regard, it is important for this Honorable Court to take note of the admission of ATTY. CAMANO that his reconstruction of the facts surrounding the instant case was made without the benefit of actual records and by simply relying on his limited memory and naturally flawed recollection of events that transpired years ago; 4. With this in mind, it may be understandable why ATTY. CAMANO may have been reckless in some of his statements especially those statements made in page 4 of his motion for reconsideration whereby he accused the undersigned counsel of having  “stabbed him in the back”.

        5. The undersigned counsel never stabbed anyone in the back because all the undersigned counsel did was to narrate the truth concerning the accusations imputed against them by complainant by complainant George Solatan and the circumstances surrounding the same and this .truth. was sufficient in itself to convince the investigating authorities:

       6. Further, it was error for ATTY. CAMANO to give the impression to this Honorable Court that the undersigned counsel kept the former in the dark;

        7. On the contrary, it was the undersigned counsel who furnished this Honorable Court the last known address of ATTY. CAMANO;

         8. Besides, even ATTY.  CAMANO’s allegations are true, the undersigned counsel should not be faulted by the failure on the part of ATTY. CAMANO to receive any pleadings, orders and/or resolutions because he himself admitted, he left for the United States without informing the IBP Board of Governors and the undersigned counsel who was a correspondent neither did he leave behind any mailing address nor any contact number;

       9. Furthermore, I take serious exception to the allegation he made in the last paragraph of page 15 of Atty.  CAMANO’ s motion for reconsideration;

       10. I NEVER RECEIVED ANY SHARE FROM ATTY. CAMANO CONCERNING ANY ATTORNEY.S FEE which was allegedly paid to him by the complainant SOLATAN; 11. (x x x reference to a privileged communication content was excised) 12. ( x x x , same)

        13. As to the alleged  “SHOOTING INCIDENT” involving my former associate ATTY. JOSE B. JOSON, I knew of no such incident and the best person to speak on the matter would be ATTY. JOSE B. JOSON himself and not ATTY. CAMANO;

     14. In closing, inasmuch as ATTY. CAMANO saw fit to compare himself with Mary Magdalene, the biblical character who was caught by the Jewish authorities in flagrant delicate, it is rather apropos because while he was saved by Christ from being stoned to death, she was likewise admonished by the Our Lord to “go and sin no more”.

     15. Thus, while I am not inclined to throw the first stone at ATTY. CAMANO, I am however admonishing him to go and sin no more.

      WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing comments and manifestation be noted by this Honorable Court and that the same be made part of the record of the above-captioned case.

        Other reliefs as are just and equitable are likewise prayed for Respectfully submitted this 4th day of October, 2005, at Quezon City for Manila.

  OSCAR A. INOCENTES

  Atty. Camano filed a rejoinder on the Comment of Atty. Inocentes:

 MOTION WITH LEAVE OF COURT TO ADMIT REJOINDER

        Respondent Atty. Jose C. Camano, by himself most respectfully requests leave of court to admit this Rejoinder to the  Comment and Manifestation filed by co-respondent Atty. Oscar A. Inocentes dated October 4, 2005 which was received by the undersigned on October 26, 2005 here in the United States in order to aid this Court in the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration of the above case. 

        Respondent Atty. Camano does not derive any distinct pleasure in defending his honor by trashing someone else’s he finds it excruciatingly painful and distasteful that to protect his honor he has to put someone else’s honor down. To ease such difficulty, he has compared himself to a biblical character, Mary  Magdalene, the  “sinner”  who was spared by Jesus Christ from being stoned to death by the equally sinning mobsters. This way, Atty. Camano, unlike his accusers, George and Atty. Inocentes, would not sound pious and self-righteous.

         In rebutting the biblical allusion, Atty. Inocentes said:

           “Thus, While I am not inclined to throw the first stone at Atty. Camano, I am however admonishing him “to go and sin no more”.

        What a self-righteous admonition! Atty. Inocentes would like to put himself in the category of Jesus Christ and has the nerve to  “admonish” Atty. Camano to “go and sin no more”.  (privileged communication content, excised).

         But enough of the biblical metaphors and allusions. x x x (privileged communication content, excised)

          Atty. Inocentes went to an extra length of filing a comment with the Supreme Court “distancing himself”,   to quote this Court, from Atty. Camano and would plead non-liability for the “fiasco”  committed by his associate, and for which he did not participate, then made a sudden turn around by accepting the admonition meted out by the Supreme Court after Atty. Camano filed his motion for reconsideration. (privileged communication, excised x x x). So the trick is for this Court to hurry up and consider the case closed for fear that any further comment by Atty. Camano might convince this Honorable Court to order a wider scale of investigation about his allegations.

            It was never the intention though of respondent Camano to open up another front in the investigation involving this incident. This case has dragged on for so long and it needs closure. If ever the issue of character has been raised against Atty. Inocentes, it was only to prove that the later does not enjoy moral superiority over Atty. Camano and of late, it was blasphemous enough for Atty. Inocentes to tell someone to  “go and sin no more”.

            It certainly is not an argument that because Atty. Camano does not have his records of the case, that his narrations of facts involving his character was flawed and limited. It has asked this Court that his narrations be compared with whatever records the Court has on the case to find out if his narrations are truthful and credible. And if one’s honor is involved, no matter how long the case had been, his recollections of those details remain etched and fresh in his  memory. His only limitation is being able to cite with definiteness the paragraph numbers and the date of the pleadings where such facts were contained.

        It certainly would not help Atty. Inocentes to claim that he did not benefit from the attorney’s fee given to Atty. Camano by George. Atty. Camano had no foreknowledge of Atty. Inocentes’ selective amnesia and had he known it, he could have asked Atty. Inocentes to sign for a receipt of the P2,500.00. (privileged communication excised). But even assuming that Atty. Camano made use of the entire sum of P5,000.00, which he believed he had worked for as a lawyer, no professional infractions should be imputed to him because he had precisely accepted the amount denominated as attorney’s fee.

         Lastly, Atty. Inocentes claimed that he should be credited for informing this Court of the last known address of Atty. Camano so the resolution of this Court could be sent thereto. Atty. Camano has always maintained the same residence and law office after he had left the office of Atty. Inocentes and even after he has migrated to the US. Atty. Inocentes knew about this address. While he has appreciated the fact that Atty. Camano must somehow be informed of the subsequent incidents in this case, he himself did not furnish Atty. Camano of his own pleadings nor extended Atty. Camano the courtesy of transmitting to him the recommendation of the IBP suspending Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one year despite his knowledge that Atty. Camano had long ceased to be his associate.

        Had he done so, Atty.  Camano could have responded thereto and brought to the attention of the Honorable Court the real issues in this case. He wanted Atty. Camano to receive the final resolution of the Supreme Court in an almost “fait accompli” status and he stand to benefit there from by offering Atty. Camano as the  “sacrificial goat” and satisfy the IBP’s officialdom’s lust for  “blood”.  

           And he is now telling this Honorable Court to consider the case closed by accepting the admonition imposed upon him by the Court, hoping that in doing so, he could foreclose any avenue available for Atty. Camano for the lifting of his suspension and prevent him from further communicating with this Court. And yet, Atty. Inocentes would deny not having less noble intention towards his former associate.

            Respondent Camano would wish to add that most of the chattels found at the subject apartment belonged to George because he has treated and considered the apartment his personal leasehold already and not of his sister Gliceria. And if one has to consider that Gliceria had long vacated the premises and the rental arrears has ballooned to P60,000 at the time of notice to vacate was served on George, excluding interest over an  apartment unit being leased at P1,300 a month, then George had occupied the apartment for a period of almost 4 years without paying the rents.

             And when ejected, he has the temerity to complain about his being ejected from the premises. He accused Atty. Camano of moral depravity and considered himself wronged by the conduct of Atty. Camano.

         For this Honorable Court to give credence to this grotesque pretension is to defy all reasons and put to doubt the capacity of our institutions to survive the forces of darkness and our ability to sift through the rubbles of falsehood and deception.

         This whole exercise would not improve Atty. Camano’s  paltry fortunes, but he would defend with all the energy he could muster, to protect his good name and honor. This pleading has taken so much of his productive endeavor in the U.S., but Atty. Camano could not in conscience, sit idly by and let falsehood and lies go unchallenged.

          This Court should take notice also that the pleadings of Atty. Inocentes do not go beyond attempt at self-preservation and he refused to elevate the discussion of the case to a level that it justly deserve.

           He refused to confront George as a purveyor of falsehood and deception. (privileged communication excised).

            As a parting note Atty. Camano offers his prayer for the soul of Atty. Florendo A. Umali.  “May the good Lord Bless his soul”.

         WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Resolution of August 9, 2005 issued by this Court suspending Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one year be set aside and a new resolution be issued clearing his name from any wrongdoing.

          That it is further prayed that though the Resolution becomes final as far as Atty. Inocentes is concerned, the effect of the new resolution, if forthcoming, be extended to Atty. Inocentes as respondent Camano’s offer of peace and embrace of a brother in the profession.

        Dearborn, Michigan, USA, October 28, 2005.

   The Supreme Court denied the motion in a minute resolution dated February 6, 2006.

    Atty. Camano filed a second motion for reconsideration.
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SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

May 26, 2008

 113                              

          1. The Honorable Court has denied with finality the First Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent to lift his suspension for one year from the practice of law for  “Technical Extortion”  in a resolution dated February 6, 2006, copy of which was received by the respondent at his house in Quezon City on February 24, 2006. The resolution states:

 Gentlemen:

         Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this court dated 06 February 2006:

         Adm. Case No. 6504 [Formerly CBD No. 019] (GEORGE C. SOLATAN VS. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES AND JOSE C. CAMANO). — Acting on the motion of respondent Atty. Jose C. Camano for reconsideration of the resolution dated 09 August 2005 suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year, with prayer that he be absolved from the alleged act of  “technical extortion” and from acts tending to degrade the law profession, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, no substantial argument having been adduce to warrant the  reconsideration sought.

     Respondent Camano begs to differ to the claim of the Honorable Court that there is no substantial argument he made in his Motion for Reconsideration to warrant the reconsideration sought.

       First, respondent Camano would like to point out that in the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated August 9, 2005, it said:

      This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon City apartment belonging to the attorneys’ clients.  On the basis of acts branded by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as “bordering on technical extortion”  accepting funds and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the IBP resolved to recommend the suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1) year. It likewise recommended the reprimand of Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the principle of command responsibility. Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, (underscoring supplied) as he questions the propriety of his being held administratively liable for acts done by Atty. Camano. However, the recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano shall also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

        Atty. Camano did not respond/contest  the recommendation of the IBP because he was not furnished a copy of the resolution of the IBP. He was furnished though of a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated August 9, 2005 suspending him from the practice of law for one year and forthwith he asked that the same be reconsidered and for the Court to read the records of the case if only to find out that Atty. Camano has acted decently and professionally in dealing with the complainant George Solatan. Thus, it was entirely erroneous to claim that Atty. Camano did not raise substantial issues in his Motion for  Reconsideration because the very issues raised in his Motion for Reconsideration are at odds and entirely opposed to the theories formulated and adopted by the IBP which was made as the basis of the Supreme Court resolution and this Honorable Court has not addressed these issues.

         Atty. Camano believes that before this Honorable Supreme Court can suspend him and deny him his right to practice law, there should be clear and unequivocal findings that he had violated his oath of office and he had infracted the professional code of conduct for lawyers.

        His suspension is criminal in nature because it deprives him the right to practice law and impacted his liberty and property right to exercise one’s profession to earn his livelihood, hence evidence of his guilt must be established beyond doubt or at least with clear and convincing proof of professional misconduct.

         If respondent cannot seek his conscience for guilt and offer atonement for such guilt, he could develop disdain and contempt for a system that has failed and a feeling that the same system must have failed countless other lawyers who were victims of malicious complainants.

         Accordingly, and for the second time Atty. Camano would most reverently ask the Honorable Supreme Court to give him the legal definition of  “extortion” and its dichotomy,  “technical extortion”.

         There is a larger issue involved in respondent’s case, and this is the fact that if respondent cannot seek justice for himself, he cannot seek justice for others. His license to practice law becomes meaningless. This Court might as well take it and revoke it.

         But one thing respondent cannot allow this Honorable Court to do and that is to take back his license with his honor in it. Respondent will defend his honor with all his might and metaphorically, with the last drop of his blood.

         Another larger issue is at hand. If a lawyer like respondent cannot seek justice before this Honorable Court, most mortals cannot seek justice either. It must have been providential that respondent had been thrust into this controversy because he is in a position to speak out his mind freely and impervious of any consequences of  censure that could hurt his pocket and harm his family. But countless other lawyers brought before this Honorable Court by losing litigants were not as lucky. They have become too timid and subservient because their license is their only ticket to provide decent meals to their families. They cannot  “talk back” to the Supreme Court because this Honorable Court has the final say. A shade of such institutional infallibility was very much evident when the Honorable Court said in its February 6, 2006 minute resolution:  x x x the Court Resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, x x x.

     While respondent may reiterate his respect to this Court, such respect by no means include blind obedience and complete surrender to everything it says and it does, for like any human institution, it is subject to errors of judgment and could be blinded by its own biases and institutional prejudices. Respondent wishes to talk back to the Supreme Court and for the second time implores it to please read the records of the case and answer respondent’s vexing question which like a toothache keeps pulsating and throbbing in his brain:   What is “extortion” and its dichotomy, “technical extortion”.

      Can a lawyer be subjected for  “technical extortion” because he implemented a court order to vacate the premises and to pay the judgment debt and accepted payment from persons who offered to pay and actually paid pittance of the arrears but not the entire arrears?

        This Honorable Court must accept the challenge of the respondent to define to him the term extortion and/or technical extortion. If respondent could be satisfied with any definition the Court may offer and such definition applies in Respondent’s situation, respondent might in due time consult his conscience, accept his wrongdoing and repent.

          Without these conditions however, respondent cannot accept any imputation of wrongdoing and would stay the course and defend his honor with the  “last drop of his blood” (metaphorically, of course).

         Accordingly, respondent reiterates that the facts of the case are as follows:

       “The dispositive portion of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court Dated 3 March 1988 rendered by late Judge Ricardo A. Buenviaje of MTC Quezon City, Branch 38 against Gliceria Solatan required her to pay the Genito spouses the amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P30,600.00) as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with interest at 24% per annum from 20 August 1987 until the premises are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.

         The deputy sheriff of the trial court served a notice to vacate and to pay the arrears against Gliceria, who incidentally had long left for the United States and left in the apartment unit to her mother, Elvira and brother George. Elvira and George came forward upon receipt of the notice to vacate and to pay the arrears and tried to see Atty. Inocentes but were shunned by the former because George was so arrogant and so they tried to see respondent Atty. Camano instead on instruction by Atty. Inocentes.

        George and Elvira offered to liquidate the judgment debts. They were allowed to stay by the authority of the landlords acting through their lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Camano but on onditions that they pay the judgment debt. Unable to come up with one-time payment, they offered to pay on installments. George came up with the payment of 50% of the attorneys. fee and P1,000 sheriff’s fee.

         They were never coerced, forced, harassed and intimidated to pay the attorney’s fee and arrears. They voluntarily went to the office of respondent Atty. Camano to offer payment. When the promised payment for the arrears become due, George and Elvira failed to pay. Atty. Camano had asked the deputy sheriff to implement the ejectment order and to enforce the collection of the unpaid debts. George and his mother offered to pay the second time around and in fact George issued 4 postdated checks in the amount of P3,400 each, 50% of the amount as payment for current rent and the other 50% to liquidate the arrears which at that period of time    has already ballooned to P60,000.

          This time they were forced to pay not by coercion employed by Atty. Camano as alleged but by virtue of a court decree being implemented by the sheriff.

          The ejectment order was postponed precisely because George tried to come up with the payment in accordance with what he had promised the first time he and his mother went to the office of Atty. Camano. The first check issued by George was encashed but the second check bounced. It was at this time that Atty. Camano finally decided to eject George and his mother from the apartment unit because he found that George was faithless to his bargain.  The third and fourth checks issued by George would similarly bounce for reason of  “account closed” because the second one was already dishonored for such reason.

         Belatedly and at his complaint before the IBP, George claimed that respondent Camano had agreed to lease the apartment unit without conditions.  It was not true. The verbal agreement reached that day was that as long George and Elvira keep their promise to amortize the arrears and pay the current rents they can stay at the apartment unit. When they failed to honor their promise, it is but logical to proceed with the ejectment to protect also the interest of the lessors, the Spouses Andres and Ludivina Genito. It was not also true that Atty. Camano promised a new lease contract in favor of George.  Any lawyer worth his name would require the substantial payment of the adjudged arrears before a new lease could be made over the same apartment unit in the name of George given the track record of his sister in defaulting in the payment plus the fact that any new lease agreement over the same unit would vacate the judgment already issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Atty. Camano’s commitment to George was to allow him to stay at the unit as long as payment was made for the rent. When he failed to pay the rent, he could not expect that Atty. Camano should continue to honor his own commitment for George’s undisturbed enjoyment of the apartment unit. He wanted to push his luck too far but he was not too lucky enough.

        Before the sheriff could auction off the items levied at the subject apartment unit, George decided to stash away the levied properties at the dead of the night. It was Mr. Esberto Recto who called the police to accost George for surreptitiously removing the levied properties from the apartment unit. He claimed he owned these chattels. Atty. Camano was asked by Mr. Recto to accompany him to the police precinct and at the precinct, George told Atty. Camano that the properties levied by the sheriff were actually his and not of his absconding sister, Gliceria, he advised George to execute an affidavit of ownership and present it to the deputy sheriff in-charge of the levy. George was asked by the police to return the chattels inside the apartment unit.

        These facts vary substantially from the unsupported claim of the IBP that the manner by which George and Elvira were ejectedfrom the premises borders on “technical extortion”.   Absence of any legalese, it was George who ejected himself by not paying the then current rent which was equitably was his own obligation already and his promise to amortize the arrears of his sister Gliceria, though technically, it was his own obligation too because he was the one using the apartment when Gliceria left for the US. He had ejected himself too by running away from the apartment in the dead of the night with his chattels in tow.

       Respondent Atty. Camano had for a while resided in the US and he could competently say that one of the reasons why the US economy is relatively stable because courts are strict in enforcing rental laws and frown upon the practice of lessees who defaulted in their rental payments.

      Also, businessmen here would be free to agree and hold each other on the basis of their words and good faith dealing. Here, George had agreed to pay for the arrears but when he breached his word, he went to the IBP to put to task the person whom he had breached honor with for malfeasance. If every George in town is believed by the Court, no businessman would invest in an apartment construction and with the lack of housing units, squatting problem is magnified. This Honorable Court should give the right message that if one uses of the utilities and amenities provided by another, he should answer for the cost thereof, legalese to the contrary, notwithstanding.

       The Court’s decision in this case has some far reaching significance. If it would favor George, it would have directly encouraged dishonesty and deception. And if the economy is in shambles, it was partly because our courts have contributed to its ruin. Respondent Camano would not tire asking this Honorable Court to please read the records because his narrations of the incident were truthful, credible and supported by the records. To the point of being repetitious, Atty. Camano would ask this Honorable Court again to answer one vexing question:

      “Since when implementing a lawful court decree of eviction and to pay the unpaid rents become extortion, technical or otherwise?”

     WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the second motion for reconsideration be granted by the Honorable Court in the interest of justice.

       February 27, 2006 Dearborn, MI., 48126, for Manila, Philippines.

 JOSE C. CAMANO

 Cc:

Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Dona Julia Vargas Avenue

Ortigas Office Complex, Pasig City

 George C. Solatan

21 Molave St. Southgreenpark Village

Tandang Sora, Quezon City

 Atty. Oscar Inocentes

19 Marunong St., Diliman, Quezon City

         Again, the Supreme Court had denied the motion in a minute resolution without any explanation and it had refused to answer the questions raised in the motion.

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